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Abstract 
Utilizing general-equilibrium models, this thesis investigate the effects of the 
inflow of cross border workers on income distribution and welfare of the native 
residents in the host economy. The short-run effects under perfect competition are 
examined in the first model, while the short- and long-run effects under oligopolistic 
competition are analyzed in the second model. For the short run with capital 
specificity, the increase in cross border workers lowers the wage rate, raises the 
rental rate in the tradable sector, but makes the rental rate in the non-tradable sector 
ambiguous. Furthermore, the inflow of cross border workers improves the welfare of 
the native residents. However, for the long run case under oligopolistic competition, 
the inflow of cross border workers lowers the wage rate and raises the rental rate in 
the host economy. The welfare of the native residents may be worsen if the negative 
effects of the fall in profits and the rise in average fixed cost are greater than the 
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1.1 Objectives of the Thesis 
The impact of labor migration has been attracted attention in many countries. In 
general, labor migration can fill the gap of the shortage of workers and help to 
accelerate economic development. Various policies to attract foreign labor inflows 
have been implemented. For instance, Singapore has been giving the rights of abode 
to foreign workers who are skilled and professional as well as earning minimum 
monthly income of S$2000. The immigrants mainly come from Malaysia，China and 
Hong Kong. By the end of June 2000, the population of Singapore is four million 
and ten thousand, where eight hundred and fifty thousand are imported labor. Hong 
Kong, the gateway to the mainland China, used to imposing restricted immigration 
control on immigrants from the mainland. However, it implements the Admission 
of Talents Scheme in the end of 1999 and the Admission of Mainland Professionals 
Scheme in the early of 2001. The objectives of these schemes are to encourage 
workers from the mainland to fill vacancies requiring highly qualified candidates that 
are scarce in the economy. Both schemes are quota-free and the immigrants are 
eligible to the rights of abode after seven consecutive years of habitation. 
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Although most governments as well as businessmen (capital owners) support 
the immigration policy, which encourages the inflows of foreign labor, labor unions 
strongly protest against it. They are afraid that the policy will lower their income 
and raise the unemployment level of domestic workers. 
Does the inflow of foreign labor really benefit the host economy? If yes, why 
do labor unions strongly protest against the immigration policy whereas businessmen 
support? These are the important issues, and the resource-allocation and welfare 
impacts to the economy are worthwhile to investigate. 
In the literature, substantial amounts of studies have examined the impact of 
labor migration on the source economy. For examples. Berry and Soligo (1969) 
shows that emigration results in a loss to the welfare of the remaining residents in the 
source country, except that the emigrants hold a large proportion of capital and leave 
capital behind in the source country. Rivera-Batiz (1982), employing a 
Heckscher-Ohlin framework, also finds that emigration hurts the welfare of the 
remaining residents in the source economy. On the other hand, Djajic (1986) 
discovers that if the flow of remittances exceeds a critical amount, the welfare of the 
remaining residents is improved. Djajic (1998) shows that in the presence of 
foreign capital, the remaining residents in the source country have a gain after 
emigration. 
In addition to the above papers, there are several papers studying the impact of 
immigration on the host economy. Rivera-Batiz (1981a) investigates the effects of 
immigration in the presence of unemployment. By using a two-good model in 
which immigration is endogenous, he concludes that the welfare effect is ambiguous. 
Brecher and Choudhri (1987), considering the choice of immigration policy versus 
capital outflows in the presence of unemployment, show that the optimal degree of 
labor migration is zero, while the welfare of the host country can be maximized by 
the optimal capital outflows. Kondoh (1999) studies the impacts of two different 
types of immigration by employing a long-run, Heckscher-Ohlin model with 
perfectly sectoral mobility of capital. Although his findings are very contributive, 
the immediate，short-run impact of labor migration on the host economy is not 
considered. Therefore, the task of this thesis is mainly to study the short-run 
impact of immigration on the host economy. 
In the literature, the short-run models are usually characterized by sectoral ly 
specific production factors. For example, in a two-good, three-factor model of 
Jones (1971), labor is sectoral ly mobile but capital is not. A change in the labor 
endowment induces capital rental rates in both sectors to move in the same direction, 
whereas the wage rate to move in an opposite direction. However, the non-tradable 
sector is not contemplated in Jones (1971). It is essential to consider the 
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non-tradable sector for the present study，since most migrants, such as doctors, 
hi-technology experts, and architects, work in this sector. 
The objective of this thesis thus is to investigate the impact of the inflow of 
foreign workers on the host economy. The first model considered is to fill the 
vacuum of the Kondoh (1999) framework, which examines the long run effects of 
immigration on the host economy under perfect competition. In reality, not all 
factors can instantaneously move between sectors. We employ a specific-factor 
model, in which capital is sectorally specified but labor is intersectorally mobile, to 
investigate the short-run impact of immigration on the host economy. Moreover, 
this model is treated as a benchmark to compare with the second model with 
imperfect competition, a main focus of this thesis. 
The second model is to study the impact of immigration on the host economy 
under oligopolistic competition and increasing return to scale technology. It is 
noted that there are some studies on various issues of oligopolistic competition with 
increasing return to scale technology. Chao and Yu (1994，1996) investigate the 
impacts of foreign capital inflows and fiscal policy on an economy under 
oligopolistic competition. An interesting extension is to use their models to study 
the short-run effects of immigration on resource allocation and welfare of the host 
economy. 
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1.2 Organization of the Thesis 
The main body of the thesis is composed of three parts, as follows: Chapter 2 is 
the literature review on migration, income distribution and welfare of the source and 
host economies. Chapter 3 uses a specific-factors model to investigate the income 
distribution and welfare effects of immigration on the host economy in the short run. 
The goods markets considered are under perfect competition. Chapter 4 extends the 
model into imperfect competition. The income distribution and welfare effects will 





There are many contributing papers that investigate various effects of labor 
migration on resource allocation, income distribution and welfare of the source and 
host economies. 
Berry and Soligo (1969) examine the effects of emigration in both the short run 
and the long run and conclude that in general emigration leads a loss to non-migrants 
in the source country. The model they considered is a one-good, two-factor 
economy with perfect competition and constant returns to scale. In the short run 
where the stock of each factor in the economy is fixed, the welfare of non-migrants 
reduces after emigration, except that the emigrants hold a relatively large proportion 
of the capital stock and leave them in the source country. In the long run where the 
capital stock is not given exogenously but rather depends on the market forces, 
emigration also causes a loss to the non-migrants. 
Rivera-Batiz (1982), employing a Heckscher-Ohlin model with perfect 
competition, studies the welfare effect of emigration on the source country. Two 
factors, labor and capital, are used to produce two types of goods, tradable and 
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non-tradable goods. Labor is intersectorally and internationally mobile, whereas 
capital is intersectorally mobile only. Since the country is small, the price of the 
tradable good is fixed by the world market. However, the price of the non-tradable 
good is endogenously determined. Moreover, the production functions of both 
goods are assumed to be homogenous of degree one, implying goods are produced 
under constant return to scale technologies. Rivera-Batiz (1982) finds that labor 
emigration rules out the opportunity of remaining residents to exchange the tradable 
good (non-tradable good) for the non-tradable good (tradable good) with potential 
emigrants, if the non-tradable good is labor-intensive (capital-intensive). This means 
that no matter the non-tradable good is labor or capital intensive, labor emigration 
will worsen the welfare of the remaining residents in the source country. 
Djajic (1986) extends the model of Rivera-Batiz (1982) by considering the 
welfare effect of emigration on the source country under the condition that emigrants 
remit income to their own countries. He assumes that there are two types of 
remaining residents: related remaining residents and unrelated remaining residents. 
The former are the relatives of emigrants and receive remittances directly while the 
latter are non-relatives and do not receive any remittances. Remittances are 
transferred to related remaining residents in the form of the tradable good. Under 
this basic setting, Djajic finds that if the flow of remittances exceeds a critical 
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amount, the welfare of the remaining residents is improved. The reason is that 
remittances in the form of the tradable good can resume the lost trading opportunity 
between the remaining residents and the emigrants mentioned in the Rivera-Batiz 
(1982) model. 
Lundahl (1987) studies the effects of emigration-cum-remittances on the real 
income of the emigrants and the remaining residents in the source country. Under a 
two-good, two-factor economy with a non-tradable good, he finds that emigration 
does not necessarily increase the real income of the emigrants. However, when the 
tradable good is labor intensive and the relative price of the non-tradable good 
increases, the emigrants definitely have a real gain. Moreover, the remaining 
workers incur a real gain and capitalists incur a real loss if the tradable good is 
capital intensive. On the other hand, if the tradable good is labor intensive, the 
results depend on the movement of the relative price of the non-tradable good. In 
case the price rises, the remaining workers make a real loss while capitalists makes a 
real gain; however, when the price falls, the remaining workers make a real gain 
while capitalists involves a real loss. 
Djajic (1998) extends the Rivera-Batiz (1982) model to investigate the effects of 
emigration on the source country in the presence of foreign capital inflows. While 
Rivera-Batiz (1982) concludes that emigration worsens the welfare of those left 
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behind in the source country, Djajic (1998) finds that the remaining residents may 
gain under the existence of foreign capital. If the pattern of the implicit trade of the 
remaining residents is in the same direction as that of the emigrants, the welfare of 
the remaining residents necessarily makes better off after emigration. 
Djajic (1998) also studies the effects of emigration-cum-remittances on the 
source country in the presence of foreign capital inflows. While Djajic (1986) finds 
that the welfare of the remaining residents will be improved after emigration if the 
flow of remittances is greater than a critical amount, Djajic (1998) shows that if 
remittances are used to finance capital accumulation, they are found to have a 
positive effect on the welfare of the remaining residents; however, if they are used 
for consumption, the welfare effect of the remaining residents is ambiguous, 
depending on the relative factor intensities of the tradable and the non-tradable 
goods. 
Wong (1995) gives an in-depth description of the findings in international labor 
migration in recent decades. By using a one-good model, he concludes that 
permanent emigration necessarily gives a loss to the source economy. This suggests 
that the government of the source economy potentially can impose taxes on the 
emigrants to compensate the loss occurred after emigration. However, if the 
positive external effect is taken into account, there is no way to compensate those left 
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behind without hurting the emigrants. 
In addition to the above studies examining the effects of migration on the source 
economy, there are several papers that investigate the effects of immigration on the 
host economy. 
Jones (1971) examines the effects of exogenous changes in commodity prices 
and labor endowments on the factor returns by using a two-by-three model. Two 
commodities are produced as well as one mobile factor and two specific factors are 
employed. Under these assumptions, he finds that an increase in the endowment of 
the mobile factor (labor) pulls down the factor return in that factor and pushes up the 
factor returns to both specific factors. 
Mayer (1974) also finds the same results showed by Jones (1971). He 
investigates the effects of exogenous changes in commodity prices and labor 
endowments on income distribution and output levels in the short run as well as 
studies the adjustment process from the short run to the long run. He defines the 
difference between the short and long run is that in the short run some factors are 
temporarily locked in and cannot be adjusted instantaneously. However, in the long 
run all factors are freely mobile across sectors within the economy. 
Under the assumption of a two-good, three-factor economy with perfect 
competition, Mayer (1974) finds that a change in labor endowments, such as 
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immigration, will pull down the wage rate and push up the returns on capital in both 
sectors in the short run. These results are the same as the results found by Jones 
(1971). Mayer (1974) argues that these results can explain why labor unions 
always oppose against the immigration policy, whereas capitalists strongly support it. 
Moreover, he also examine the adjustment process and finds that it counteracts the 
short-run effects during the capital-reallocation period, in which the wage rate is 
rising and the returns on capital in both sectors are declining. 
Rivera-Batiz (1981) develops a two-sector model, in which immigration is 
endogenous and unemployment is caused by a sector-specific administered wage，to 
analyze the effects of immigration. The economy consists of two sectors: modem 
and traditional. The former, producing exportable goods, is characterized by the 
high-administered wage and unemployment, and the latter, producing importable 
goods, is using foreign and domestic labor in production. He finds that immigration 
increases the unemployment rate of domestic labor since it induces labor to shift 
from the traditional into the modem sector. Moreover, immigration leads to a 
redistribution of income from labor to the non-labor input in the traditional sector. 
Rivera-Batiz (1981) concludes that the effect of immigration on the total income of 
the non-immigrants is ambiguous, depending on the relative strength of the increased 
unemployment and the net income increase received by the owners of the non-labor 
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input. 
Brecher and Choudhri (1987) study the choice of immigration policy versus 
capital outflows in the presence of unemployment. They employ a two-country, 
one-good, two-factor model with perfect competition, and assume that the home 
country is capital abundant and has a minimum-income guarantee，in the form of a 
benefits package comprising of unemployment insurance and welfare payments, for 
its labor. They show that no factor mobility at all is better than free factor mobility 
and conclude that the optimal degree of labor migration is zero and the welfare of the 
host country can be maximized by the optimal capital outflows. 
Borjas (1987) investigates the factors that determine the quality of the 
immigrants in the U. S. There is an assertion that the most able workers migrate to 
the U. S. Borjas (1987) shows that the assertion can be true only under the 
following two conditions: (i) there is a strong positive correlation about the earnings 
in the U. S. and the source country; and (ii) the U. S. has a more unequal income 
distribution than the source country. Moreover, he analyzes the earning of the 
immigrants from 41 different countries using the 1970 and 1980 censuses and finds 
that the immigrants from western European countries perform well in the U. S. labor 
market and their cohorts have shown a general increase in their earnings over the 
post-war period. However, the immigrants from the less developed countries do not 
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perform well in the U. S. labor market and their cohorts have showed a general 
decrease in their earnings over the post-war period. Borjas (1987) also shows that if 
the source countries have high levels of GNP, low levels of income inequality and 
politically competitive system, the immigrants from those countries have high levels 
of income in the U. S. relative to their measured skills. 
Wong (1995) analyzes the issues of temporary migration as well as guest 
workers, and concludes that the government of the host country can use labor inflows 
as a commercial policy instrument. Two cases are considered: The first is that the 
government of the host economy imposes the immigration policy to save the labor 
shortage in the economy during good economic situation, and the second case is that 
the government imposes the policy to solve the problem of import competition. 
Kondoh (1999), employing a Heckscher-Ohlin model, investigates the effects of 
immigration on the host country. He assumes that a small country with full 
employment uses capital and labor to produce two types of goods: tradable and 
non-tradable goods under constant return to scale technologies. Both factors of 
production are intersectorally mobile and only labor is internationally mobile. 
Based on this setting, Kondoh (1999) studies the effects of the inflows of permanent 
migrants, cross-border workers and temporary migrants on the prices and welfare of 
the host country. The difference between permanent migrants and cross-border 
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workers is that the latter will remit all income to their home country whereas the 
former will not. Temporary migrants will remit part of income to their home 
country and will return to the home country after they earn enough money. Kondoh 
(1999) mainly concerns the effects of the first two types of immigrants on the host 
country and argues that the effects of temporary migrants on the host economy 
should lie between those of permanent immigrants and cross-border workers. He 
finds that if the non-tradable good is labor-intensive (capital-intensive), the inflow of 
either type of immigrants will increase (decrease) the supply of the non-tradable 
good. If the relative price of the non-tradable good is unchanged initially, there will 
be excess supply (excess demand) of the non-tradable good and the price will be 
pulled down (pushed up). Moreover, he finds that the inflow of cross-border workers 
(permanent migrants) will cause a larger (smaller) change in the price than the inflow 
of permanent migrants (cross-border workers) if the non-tradable good is 
labor-intensive (capital intensive). 
Using the effects of both types of immigrants on the relative price, Kondoh 
(1999) examines the effects on the factor prices and discovers that no matter the 
non-tradable good is labor-intensive or capital-intensive, the inflow of either type of 
immigrants pulls down the wage rate and pushes up the rental price. However，if 
the good is labor-intensive (capital-intensive), the inflow of cross-border workers 
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causes a larger (smaller) change in the factor prices than the inflow of permanent 
migrants. Furthermore, he investigates the welfare effects of both types of 
immigration on non-immigrants in the host economy. The conclusions are: no 
matter the non-tradable good is labor-intensive or capital-intensive, the welfare of 
non-immigrants after the inflow of either type of immigrants is improved. 
Furthermore, if the good is labor-intensive (capital-intensive), the inflow of 
cross-border workers (permanent migrants) improves the welfare of non-immigrants 
more (less) than the inflow of permanent migrants (cross-border workers). 
Fuest and Thum (2000) examine the welfare effect of immigration in a dual 
labor market. They assume that a small economy consists of two sectors: unionized 
and competitive sectors. The wage rate in the unionized sector is determined by the 
bargaining between unions and firms whereas that in the competitive sector by the 
market forces. No unions and firms discriminate against the immigrants, and the 
immigrants have the same chances as the native workers to get jobs in the unionized 
sector. Under this basic setting, they show that labor inflows necessarily increase the 
employment in the unionized sector. The reason is that immigration raises the 
number of workers in the economy, which pulls down the wage rate in the 
competitive sector. This reduces the reservation utility of unions while bargaining 
with firms. Thus，the wage rate in the unionized sector also declines and 
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employment in the unionized sector increases. The effect of immigration on the 
welfare of the native population is ambiguous, depending on the elasticities of labor 
demand in the unionized and the competitive sectors. The welfare of the native 
population is enhanced if the elasticities of labor demand in the unionized and the 
competitive sectors are the same or the labor demand in the competitive sector is less 
elastic than that in the unionized sector. If the labor demand in the unionized sector 
is more rapid, the welfare effect depend on the overall amount of immigration. If 
the amount is small, the welfare of the native population worsens; if the amount is 
large, the result is reversed. 
Hazari and Sgro (2000) analyze the impacts of illegal immigration in the 
context of a model of trade and growth. They assume that illegal migrants are 
sector-specific whereas domestic labor and capital are intersectorally mobile. 
Domestic labors employed in the sector using illegal migrants are less productive. 
They find that, under these assumptions, there is a production possibility curve (with 
migrants) that lies partially inside the zero migration production possibility frontier. 
Based on this feature, uncertain results on the relation between illegal migrants, 
domestic welfare and enforcement will be obtained. An optimal level of 
expenditure on enforcement is existed as the domestic welfare after illegal 
immigration may rise or fall. They conclude that the steady-state growth path with 
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illegal migrants may lie above or below the balanced growth path without migrants.‘ 
‘There are other relevant studies on the issues and policies of migration to the source and host 
economies. See, for example, Bhagwati and Hamada (1982), Boijas (1994), Ethier (1986), Hill 
(1987), Spair (1983), etc. 
17 
Chapter 3 
A Model with Perfect Competition 
3.1 Introduction 
In the literature, there are three types of migrants to the host economy: 
permanent migrants, cross-border workers and temporary migrants. The difference 
between permanent migrants and cross border workers is that the latter will remit all 
income to their home countries whereas the former will not. On the other hand, 
temporary migrants will remit part of income to their home countries.^ To sharpen 
and simplify the analysis, only the case of cross border workers will be considered in 
the thesis.3 
This chapter investigates the impact of the inflow of cross border workers on the 
host economy when capital is sectorally specific. The sectoral specificity of capital is 
considered as a short-run phenomenon, which is different from the long-run analysis 
of Kondoh (1999) under perfectly sectoral mobility of capital. In reality, some 
factors are locked in and not intersectorally mobile in the short run. It is thus 
important to consider this case. We focus on the income distribution and welfare 
2 See Kondoh (1999) for details. 
3 In general, cross border workers are one type of temporary migrants because both of them will 
return to their home countries sooner or later. In this thesis, the case of permanent migrants is not 
considered because their preferences may be different from those of native residents in the host 
economy, thereby resulting in a problem of utility aggregation. 
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effects of cross-border workers to the host economy. In addition, a non-tradable 
good will be included in the study. 
Jones (1971) and Mayer (1974) find that a change in a labor endowment causes 
the rental rates in both tradable sectors to move in the same direction, whereas the 
wage rate to move in the opposite way. Mayer (1974), based on these findings， 
explains the reasons why labor unions strongly protest against the immigration policy, 
whereas all capitalists support it. However, the existence of the non-tradable good 
makes the analysis more complicated. We find that foreign labor inflows trigger the 
redistribution of income in the host economy. The inflow of cross-border workers 
induces the wage rate to decrease, the rental rate in the tradable sector to increase and 
that in the non-tradable sector to change in an uncertain way. Despite this, the 
effect of the increase in cross-border workers on the welfare of the native residents in 
the host economy is positive. 
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section constructs the 
basic model. The second section studies the income distribution and welfare effects 
of a change in cross border workers on the host economy, followed by the welfare 
analysis in the third section. 
3.2 The Model 
IQ 
Assume that a small economy employs labor and capital to produce two kinds 
of goods under perfect competition. One good is tradable while the other is 
non-tradable. Labor is freely mobile between two sectors and capital is sectorally 
specific. The government imposes a quantitative restriction on the inflow of cross 
border foreign workers. 
The production functions of two goods can be expressed as 
X = X{L,,K,) (1) 
y = Y{Ly,Ky) (2) 
where X and Y are the non-tradable and tradable goods, respectively. L^ is labor 
employed for producing good X whereas Ly for producing good Y; K^ and 
Ky are capitals used in producing goods X and Y, respectively. Both production 
functions are assumed to be linearly homogeneous and quasi-concave. 
Under the assumption of perfect competition, factor prices should be equal to 
the values of their marginal products. Since we assume that labor is intersectorally 
mobile whereas capital is specified in each sector，the wage rate in both sectors 
should be equal whereas the rental rates in both sectors are different. Thus，we have 
the following equations: 
4 Rivera-Batiz (1991, 1982), Djajic 0986) , Lundahl (1987), Quibria (1988), Djajic (1998) and 
Kondoh (1999) analyze labor migration by considering an economy which produces and consumes 
two kinds of goods: tradable and non-tradable. Although only one traded good exists in the economy, 
"there is balanced trade since the output and demand for traded goods are equal" (Rivera-Batiz [1981, 
p. 83，lines 7-8]). That is, trade is balanced even there is one traded good. 
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Px^L = = ^ (3) 
P x ^ K = r , (4) 
Yk = ry (5) 
where all prices are expressed in terms of good Y. w is the wage rate in the 
economy; r^ and ry are the rental rates of Kx and Ky, respectively. Here, 
dY 
Xj = — ~ and Y, = - ~ are the marginal products of labor in sectors X and Y; 
‘ dLx dLy 
and XK = ^ ^ and Yj. = represent the marginal products of capital in 
dK X oKy 
sectors X and Y. 
Under the full employment condition, the factor market equilibriums can be 
expressed as 
Ly +Ly = L+Lf (6) 
Kx = ^x (7) 
ATy = Ky (8) 
where L is the amount of native labor; and L^ is the amount of cross border 
foreign workers. Equations (7) and (8) capture the case of capital specificity. 
Next step is to consider the domestic supply functions of both goods. From 
equations (1) to (8), the supply functions depend on the factor 
endowments, L ’ K^ and Ky, the inflow of foreign workers, Lj., and the relative price 
of the non-tradable good, P^r. Since the factor endowments are unchanged, the 
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supply functions of the non-tradable and tradable goods can be accordingly shown as 
S x = s A P x , h � (9) 
= S y [ p , , L f ) (10) 
After finding the supply functions, let us consider the demand functions of both 




where I is national income in the host economy，which can be respectively expressed 
as 
I = wL+r^K^ + ryKy (13) 
where wL is the wage income of native labor, r^ K^ is the capital income in 
sector X, and Vy Ky is the capital income in sector Y.^  
The market clearing condition requires that demand equals supply. By 
Walras's law, the market clearing condition in sector Y is omitted in the present 
model^. Thus, we only concern the market clearing condition in sector X, which 
can be shown as 
S , { P , , L , ) = D A P x J ) (14) 
5 The income of cross border workers is remitted back to their home countries. 
6 Rivera-Batiz (1982), Lundahl (1987) and Kondoh (1999) use Walras's law to omit one of market 
equilibrium conditions. 
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Equations (1) - (8) and (13) - (14) define the basic setting of this model. 
Starting from next section, we will investigate the effects of the inflows of cross 
border workers on the host economy. 
3.3 Income Distribution 
The prerequisite condition in studying the welfare effect, which is the essence of 
this model, is to understand the impacts of cross border workers on the relative price, 
the wage and rental rates in both sectors. 
3.3.1 Changes in the Relative Price 
To study the effect of changes in cross border workers on the price of the 
non-tradable good in the host economy, we solve equation (14) to obtain: 
dl\ Sy, 
—= — (15) 
從X 
QS ^ QIC.� 
where Sy^ = ~ — = Xj Xk ———is the effect of cross border workers on 
‘ dLj- j dLj. dLj- J 
the supply of good X. As shown in Appendix Al, — lies between zero and one 
dLf 
己K 
and———is zero, given that capital in sector X is fixed. Thus, S^l is positive and 
dLj- ‘ 
smaller than one. By the requirement of the Walrasian stability, the denominator of 
(ip ^  
equation (15) is negative. Therefore, — in (15) is negative. The inflow of 
dLj. 
cross border workers pulls down the relative price of good X. 
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Kondoh (1999) finds that under the assumption that all factors are freely mobile 
in the host economy，the inflow of immigrants lowers (raises) the relative price if the 
non-tradable good is labor-intensive (capital-intensive). In the present model where 
capital is specified in each sector, the inflow of cross border workers necessarily 
pulls down the relative price of the non-tradable good. 
3.3.2 Income Distribution 
The inflow of cross border workers will affect the wage and the rental rates in 
both sectors. First of all, we divide equation (1) into two separated equations: 
P x X , = Y, ( 1 6 ) 
(17) 
Solving (4) - (8), (16) and (17), we obtain the following results: 
c/w PXXLJll f . X dpA , … 
——=_X ll LL 1 + L (18) 
dh Px^ii dL,] 
dr, _ -PX^IJll , f PxXu^L 丨 ^ ) & _ 
dLf ” dLf 
i = -PX^llYLL L + Xl dpA 
1 K 
where we use the relation Xjj. = -X!丄——，and define k^ = — . 
kx Lx 
Equations (18) to (20) show the effects of the inflow of cross border workers on 
the wage and the rental rates in sectors X and Y, respectively. Jones (1971) and 
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Mayer (1974) find that under the assumption that both goods are tradable, the 
inflows of labor pull down the wage rate and push up the rental rates in both sectors. 
In the present model, integrated with the effects mentioned by Jones (1971) and 
Mayer (1974), the existence of the non-tradable good makes the relative price of the 
non-tradable good endogenously determined, which affects the value of the marginal 
products of factors and the changing directions of the factor prices. Since the 
inflow of cross border workers pulls down the relative price of the non-tradable good, 
shown in equation (15), it pulls down the wage rate, and raises the rental rate in the 
tradable sector. However, the change in the rental rate in the non-tradable sector is 
uncertain. Thus, only the capital owners in the tradable sector can definitely earn 
higher returns. 
Mayer (1974) employs the findings to explain the reasons why labors strongly 
protest against foreign labor inflows whereas capitalists support. Kondoh (1999) 
finds that in the long run with the presence of the non-tradable good, the inflows of 
foreign labor lower the wage rate and raise the rental rates in both sectors. However, 
from the present findings, we show that although the wage rate is inevitably pulled 
down, not all capitalists can definitely have a gain after foreign labor inflows in the 
short run. The capital owners in the non-tradable good may take a loss after foreign 
labor inflows. 
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3.4 Welfare Analysis 
The ultimate objective of this model is to examine the effect of cross border 
workers on the welfare of the native residents in the host economy. Their utility 
function can be expressed as 
U = U{D, ,Dy) (21) 
By utility maximization, the indirect utility function, which represents the 
welfare of the economy, can be shown as 
V = V{P,XI) (22) 
To investigate the welfare effect, we need to differentiate equation (22) totally 




where — is the marginal utility of income which is positive since we assume both 
goods are normal. 
Let us examine the welfare effect of cross border workers on the native 
residents in the host economy. Differentiating the national income equation (13) 
totally, then substituting the result into equation (23) and using the results in 
equations (15) and (18) - (20), we obtain: 
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1 dV , dw 
dl 
Equation (24) shows that the welfare effect of an increase in cross border workers on 
the native residents in the host economy depends on the change in the wage rate paid 
to them. In the previous section, we find that the increase in foreign workers pulls 
down the wage rate, implying that cross border workers also receive lower wages. 
This saves the production cost of the economy; therefore, the welfare of the native 
residents in the host economy improves. 
Kondoh (1999) finds that in the long rim, the welfare of the native residents in 
the host economy is definitely improved after the inflows of foreign workers. In the 
present model, we can also conclude that foreign labor inflows also enhance the 
welfare of the native residents even in the short run. 
Let us reiterate our findings of this chapter in the following preposition: 
Preposition 1. For a small open economy with short-run immobility of capital 
between sectors, the inflow of cross border workers (i) reduces the relative price of 
the non-tradable good, (ii) pulls down the wage rate in both sectors, (iii) raises the 
capital rental rate in the tradable sector, but (iv) leaves the rental rate in the 
non-tradable sector ambiguous. Furthermore, the inflow of cross border workers 
improves the welfare of the native residents in the host economy. 
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Chapter 4 
A Model with Imperfect Competition 
4.1 Introduction 
The resource allocation and welfare effects of labor migration have been widely 
examined under perfect competition. For instance. Berry and Soligo (1969), 
Rivera-Batiz (1982), Djajic (1986), Lundahl (1987) and Djajic (1998) examine the 
welfare effects of labor emigration on the source economy, whereas Rivera-Batiz 
(1981a) and Kondoh (1999) investigate the impacts of immigration on the host 
economy. In the real world, imperfect competition prevails. However, the study 
on the effects of immigration to the host economy under imperfect competition 
remains by and large deficient. 
The purpose of this chapter is to fill the vacuum and examine the impact of the 
inflow of cross border workers on the host economy under oligopolistic competition 
with an increasing return to scale technology. We will show that, under oligopolistic 
competition, the inflow of cross border workers improves the welfare of the native 
residents in the host economy in the short run but the long-run welfare effect is 
ambiguous. 
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section constructs the basic 
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model, while the second section studies the effects of cross border workers on 
outputs and income distribution of the host economy. The welfare analysis is 
provided in the third section. 
4.2 The Model 
Assume that a small open developing economy produces two kinds of goods: 
non-tradable (good X) and tradable (good Y)7 For rendering the analysis tractable, 
the utility function of the native residents in the host economy is assumed to be 
quasi-linear: 
U{D, ,Dy) = U { D , y D , (1) 
where Dx and Dy are the domestic consumption demands for goods X and Y, 
respectively. 
Because of employing this function to represent the taste of the domestic 
residents in the host country, the model focuses on the price effect only. Solving the 
utility maximization problem yields the inverse demand function of the non-tradable 
good: 
P x = P A D X � (2) 
7 Following Rivera-Batiz (1982), Djajic (1986), Lundahl (1987)，Quibria (1988), Djajic (1998) and 
Kondoh (1999), a two-good, tradable and non-tradable, framework is adopted. 
8 Konishi et al. (1990) and Chao and Yu (1994，1996) analyze oligopolistic competition by employing 
this quasilinear utility function. 
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where Px and Py denote, respectively, the prices of goods X and Y. Note that 
< ! > ( / ) x � =说� ( " J > 0 and 於 ' (1 \ )<0 . By choosing the tradable good to be 
dDx ‘ 
numeraire, the price of good Y, Py is normalized to be unity. Moreover，using the 
feature of the non-tradable good that the domestic demand for and the domestic 
supply of the good must be equal, equation (2) can be simplified as: 
P x = A x � (3) 
where X is the non-tradable good produced in the host economy. 
After considering the demand side of the model, we turn to the production side 
of the economy. Assume the non-tradable sector is under oligopolistic competition 
with increasing return to scale technology. There are n numbers of identical firms 
in the sector. The total output, X，in this sector is the sum of each firm's output, x; 
i.Q.,X = Labor, Lx, and capital, Kx, are used to produce the good under 
increasing return to scale technology. Because of imperfect competition in this 
sector, each firm can make profits. The firm's profit function can be written as 
= (4) 
where n is the profit of the firm, C(.) is the cost function, and wx and rx are the 
wage and the rental of labor and capital’ respectively. 
As for the cost function, there are two parts: variable cost and fixed cost. The 
variable cost depends on the level of output but fixed cost does not: 
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, , = ^ { ^ X , , , + H ^ x ， � ) (5) 
where m(.) is the marginal cost in producing good x and m(.)x： is the variable cost. 
It is noted that F(.) is the fixed cost and hence average fixed cost, F/x, declines when 
X increases. This captures the scale effect in the model. Furthermore, the 
marginal cost and fixed cost functions are homogeneous of degree one with respect 
to the wage and rental rates. 
Substituting equation (5) into (4), the firm's profit function can be expressed as 
follows: 
；r = ^{X)x - m(w Y , r x ) x - , r^) (6) 
The first order condition of maximizing the firm's profit in (6) gives: 
<l>'[x)xr^(l>{x)=m{w,,r,) (7) 
Equation (7) shows that perceived marginal revenue equals marginal cost. It is noted 
that y - — = 1 + Z 办一 is the firm's conjecture about the market supply response 
dx dx 
to a change in the firm's own output. If 7=0, then iff{x) = m{wy,ry), implying 
perfect competition; if r 二1, then (/>'{x)x + (/>{x) = , ), yielding Coumot 
competition; i f y =n, then (/}\X�xn + (l>{x) = leading to cartel; i f 7 =l=n, 
then (l>'{x)x + ^{x) = resulting in monopoly. In this model, we assume 
\<y<n. 
Turn to the production of the tradable good. Assume that the economy uses 
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labor {Ly) and capital (Ky) to produce good Y (tradable good) under perfect 
competition with constant return to scale technology. Since good Y is produced 
under perfect competition, the firms in this sector earn zero profit. The unit cost 
function of good Y’ which is homogeneous of degree one with respect to factor prices, 
is as follows: 
g{wy,ry)=Py (8) 
After considering the demand side and the supply side of the economy, we turn 
to the factor markets. As mentioned above, the non-tradable good uses labor (Lx) 
and capital (Kx) for production, whereas the tradable good uses labor (Lr) and capital 
(KY). Applying Shephard's lemma to the cost functions, we obtain the demand for 
labor and capital in each sector: 
Lx = � ( w p 广AT + ^ . (wY.rY) (9) 
Kx = ^rh^x^^x + ) (10) 
[r = g > r ， 化 (11) 
(12) 
where, for example, m^ = and hence m is the amount of variable labor 
加A-
inputs for producing the non-tradable good. 
In the present model, labor is intersectorally mobile in both the short run and the 
long run. In addition, there are the inflows of foreign labor to the economy. Thus, 
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the market clearing condition of the labor market can be expressed as 
L^ +Ly = (13) 
where L is the amount of native labor and Lfis the inflow of cross border workers. 
Substituting equations (9) and (11) into (13), the market clearing condition of the 
labor market can be re-written as 
�(诚A'，rY K + ^Ki^x^^x)+ = L + (14) 
As aforementioned, the firms in the non-tradable sector use Kx for production, 
whereas those in the tradable sector use Ky. In the short run, capital is fixed in each 
sector and the market clearing conditions of the capital markets require: 
^ r i ^ x )义 + K^ (15) 
= (16) 
However, in the long run, capital is intersectorally mobile and the market clearing 
condition of capital is: 
^rh'x^rx k + " 厂 ， � ) + = F (IV) 
The equations (3) and (6) - (17) serve as the foundation for studying the effects 
of cross border workers on the host economy under oligopolistic competition. 
4.3 Outputs and Income Distribution 
We start with investigating the effects of cross border workers on outputs and 
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income distribution of the host economy. These provide some preliminary results 
for studying the effects of cross border workers on the welfare of the host economy, 
the main objective of this chapter. 
To begin with, we examine the relations of the output, wage and rental rates in 
the non-tradable sector. Totally differentiating the profit maximization condition of 
dx 




- + 乙 x-aseZ^^w^ -asOZirx = 0 (18) 
V n n) ‘ 
_ D A" 
where e = is the elasticity of the slope of the demand for the non-tradable 
good, £ = ^ — is the price elasticity of the non-tradable good, a = — is the 
伞，Dx (j) 
marginal cost-price ratio which is larger than zero and smaller than one in case of 
imperfect competition, OTy = 评％ is the marginal cost share of labor in the 
一 m 
YYl , 
non-tradable sector, and^^y = ‘ is the marginal cost share of capital in the 
m 
non-tradable sector. It is noted that + 0 ^ = 1 . In addition, as shown in 
Appendix A2, the coefficient of x in equation (18) is negative for stability of the 
model. 
Equation (18) indicates that if the rental rate in sector X or the wage rate 
increases, the cost of production in sector X is pushed up and each firm is forced to 
decrease the output of good X, vice versa. Moreover, the first term on the left hand 
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side shows the negative relationship between the perceived marginal revenue and the 
output of each firm in the non-tradable sector. In other words, if the output of each 
firm in the non-tradable sector increases, the perceived marginal revenue decreases, 
vice versa. 
4.3.1 Short-Run Capital Specificity 
To find the output and income distribution effects, we need to consider the 
responses in the factor markets. Consider first the case of capital specificity in the 
short run. Totally differentiating equations (14) - (16) yields: 
( Q \ 
义文-S^v + ^ r + Sir ^x + + X j = SL^ (19) 
V "灯 y 
^Ix ^  + Sfcx - s以,？X = 0 (20) 
(21) 
where 又2y 二 义 and =爪”乂 are the input shares of variable labor and 
L + Lj- K Y 
J K 
capital in the non-tradable sector, and X^ y = “ and A 灯 = a r e the input 
L + Lj- K 
p- ， 
shares of labor and capital in the tradable sector. In addition,没,= �‘ ^ and 
Py 
Of^Y = g广 are the cost shares of labor and capital in the tradable sector，is the cost 
share of capital in the tradable sector. Furthermore, we define the following: 
5 = J l - = 彻 - 二 … = = … a n d 
L+Lj. L+Lf “ L+Lj. M Kx 
35 
'^ky - - • 
Ky 
It is noted that equations (19) and (21) can be combined as 
+ 义 " I ^ V x + 仏 = S L , (22) 
V "灯 廿KY y 
Therefore, equation (18), (20) and (22) can be used to solve three 
A 
unknowns, x, w ^  and r^ , as functions of the policy variable, Lj.. Putting (18), (20) 
and (22) in a matrix form, we have: 
~ / \ -
- 1 + - - — -asOZ, -asO"^ r ^ n r n 1 乂 n n J •At u 
^Iv Skx -SKX = 0 (23) 
c . ^LY . ； Sky O r^ 5Lr 
儿Lx - 十 " ~ 乙Y � L � 
_ V 廿KY "KY / _ 
Let A be the determinant of the coefficient matrix in equation system (23). We 
have 
A = 1 H H -( X 1 
V n “ y ^KX "‘‘ ^LY^KY ) ^KX 
As shown in Appendix A2, A must be positive for stability. Then, the effects of 
cross border workers on the firm's output and factor prices in the non-tradable sector 
can be obtained as 
A 二 asSS以, (24) 
h A 
， 、 “ (25) 
A 
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/ / \ \ 
� ^ 1 + 
ry I I n n J) 
f - = - P 丄 ( 2 6 ) 
Equation (24) indicates that the inflow of cross border workers causes the firm's 
output in the non-tradable sector to increase in the short run. Equation (25) states 
that the wage rate decreases because of foreign labor inflows, while equation (26) 
shows that the effect of cross border workers on the rental rate in the non-tradable 
sector is uncertain. The inflow of cross border workers pushes up the capital 
demand in sector X and thus raises the rental rate in sector X initially. However, the 
increase in each firm's output in the non-tradable sector pulls down the perceived 
marginal revenue and hence capital demand in the non-tradable sector. The final 
direction of the rental rate in sector X is thus ambiguous. 
To find the effects of the inflow of cross border workers on the output and rental 
rate in the tradable sector, we substitute the result of equation (25) into equation (21) 
, 一 Q… 
and use the relation ry =———Wy to obtain: 
^KY 
f / ^ 
- Sky ^  义ZY + -^ aiy M + " " 
i — ( 2 7 ) 
/ / \\ 
各 、““」」 (28) 
Lf 人tA 
Equations (27) and (28) show that the increase in cross border workers pushes up 
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both the output and the rental rate in the tradable sector of the host economy. 
The directions of changes in the factor prices are the same as those found in last 
chapter under the assumption of perfect competition with constant return to scale 
technologies in the short run. We can conclude that for the short-run capital 
specificity, the inflow of cross border workers lowers the wage rate in both sectors， 
raises the rental rate in the tradable sector. However, the rental rates in the 
non-tradable sector are uncertain for both cases of perfect and imperfect competition. 
4.3.2 Long-Run Capital Mobility 
After investigating the output and income distribution effects for the short-run 
capital specificity, we turn to examine the same issues for the long-run case with 
capital mobility. Differentiating (8), (14) and (17) totally and then using 
Wy = Wy and r^ =ry,wQ obtain: 
^Lv'^x =0 (29) 
+Ary = SLj. (30) 
X'^x + Bw^ - BPy +Xf.yY=0 (31) 
where A = S^x + ^^ y and B = S以 + 5•灯，in which S^^ =彻冰a'纟《’沙a, ^ d 
Sf^ Y =权：协} . Note that 义：丫 二 ^― is the share of total capital used as a 
K K 
variable input in the non-tradable sector. 
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Furthermore, we can combine (30) and (31) to obtain: 
(32) 
儿KY 
A A"' A 
where C = A + B—^, and A"' = — captures the difference in marginal 
A 灯 Ajy 
capital intensities of capital between the two sectors. 
Next, we put (18), (29) and (32) in the matrix form: 
/ / \ \ 
- 1 + - - — — a s e z： - a s O l , ( r 0 ^ 
V n n J 
爪 e,, 〜， H ' , . = 0 (33) 
- 义 口 — c c J 
、 义灯 y 
Let H be the determinant of the coefficient matrix in equation system (33), which can 
be expressed as 
H 二 f i i / ^Ac “ � A r 义”'秘】r 
V n n J /I 灯 
Qm n 
where 6"' = —^ — is the difference in marginal capital intensity between two 
sectors in cost term. Appendix A2 shows that the stability condition of the model 
requires the coefficient of the first term on the right hand side of the H expression 
and the difference in marginal intensities of capital between the two sectors should 
be positive. Thus, the sign of H is negative. 
Using the Cramer's rule, the long-run effects of the increase in cross border 
workers on the output and income distribution in the host economy can be shown as 
L^ H 
t = (35) 
驚 = k (36) 
Equation (34) shows that the increase in cross border workers causes the output of 
each firm in the non-tradable sector to decrease in the long run. This result is similar 
to the Rybczynski effect, which states that an increase of a labor endowment induces 
the labor-intensive sector to increase its production and the capital-intensive sector to 
decrease its production. Although the Rybczynski effect is under the assumption 
that an economy produces its products under constant return to scale technology in 
the Heckscher-Ohlin model, we find that such result is also applicable to the present 
model. To recap, assuming that the non-tradable sector is capital-intensive, the 
increase in cross border workers lowers the firm's output in the non-tradable sector in 
the long run. 
Equation (35) shows that the wage rate decreases because of the inflows of 
foreign labor. Equation (36) shows that the inflow of cross border workers raises the 
rental rate in the non-tradable sector. 
As for the change in the output of the tradable sector, we use the results of 
equations (34) - (36) and then rearrange equation (31) to obtain: 
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J_ _ L V n w 力 
Lf 又kyH 
Equation (37) shows the positive effect of the inflow of cross border workers on the 
output of the tradable good. The result reflects the Rybczynski effect that the 
increases in labor booms the labor-intensive industry. 
From the results of equations (34) - (37), in the long run, the increase in cross 
border workers pulls down the wage rate as well as pushes up the rental rate. The 
directions of changes in factor prices are the same as those found by Kondoh (1999) 
under the Heckscher-Ohlin model Thus, we can conclude that, in the long run, the 
inflow of cross border workers raises the rental rate and lowers the wage rate in both 
cases of perfect and oligopolistic competition. Moreover, we find that similar to the 
Rybczynski effect, the increase in cross border workers pushes up the output of the 
tradable good and pulls down the output of the non-tradable good. 
The following preposition is to summarize the results in the section: 
Preposition 1. Consider the host economy with the non-tradable sector characterized 
by oligopolistic competition. In the short run with sectoral capital specificity, the 
inflow of cross border workers pulls down the wage rate and pushes up the outputs of 
both goods. However, only the rental rate in the tradable sector increases. For the 
long run with capital mobility between sectors, the inflow of cross border workers 
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lowers the wage rate and raises the rental rate. In addition, the inflow of cross border 
workers increases the output of the tradable sector but decreases the output of the 
non-tradable sector. 
4.4 Welfare Analysis 
Does the inflow of cross border foreign workers lower the welfare of the native 
residents in the host economy? This section examines this issue. 
The utility of the domestic residents in the host economy can be represented by 
the indirect utility function, which depends on the goods prices and their income: 
V = V [ P , , P y j ) (38) 
where V is the indirect utility function and I is income of the domestic residents in 
the host economy. Since good Y is chosen as the numeraire, Py is normalized to 
be unity. Substituting equation (3) into (38) yields: 
P^  = _ A O，U ) (39) 
To investigate the welfare effect of the native residents in the host economy, we 
differentiate equation (39) totally and then employ Roy's identity: 
^ = + (40) 
'df 
where D^ is the domestic demand for good X. 
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4.4.1 Short-Run Capital Specificity 
In this section we investigate the welfare effect of the inflow of cross border 
workers to the native residents of the host economy in the short run when capital is 
sectorally specific. The income of the native residents is: 
I = WyL + r^Ky +ryKy + njt (41) 
where the rates of return on capital are different, i.e., r^ * . 
The change in income can be obtained by differentiating equations (41) and then 
— g 
by using the relation dt\ = -dwy , we can obtain the change of welfare from (40) 
gr 
as 
1 dV , dwj, ( C�dx f F^ dx 
=-Lf—+ « p + « (42) 
W dhf f dLf 、 jcJdLj. \x)dLj. V ) 
If 
The first term on the right hand side of (42) shows that the wage rate decreases in the 
short run because of the inflows of cross border foreign labor. The fall in the wage 
payments to foreign workers improves the welfare of the native residents in the host 
economy. This is the result obtained in the previous chapter under perfect 
competition. However, when the market of the non-tradable good is under 
oligopoly, the divergence between average price (p) and average cost (C/x) results in 
a distortion, which is reflected in the second term of (42). In addition, due to the 
existence of fixed cost (F) in production, the scale effect is appeared in the third term 
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of (42). 
As shown in (24), the increase in cross border workers increases the production 
of the non-tradable good in the short run, both the second and third terms of (42) are 
positive. Thus, the inflow of foreign workers improves the welfare of the native 
residents of the host economy in the short run when capital is sectorally specific. 
It is of interest to compare the welfare effects of the inflow of cross border 
workers on the native residents in the host economy under perfect and imperfect 
competition in (24) and (42). We find that in both cases, the increase in foreign 
workers improves the welfare of the native residents in the host economy. However, 
due to the scale effect and the positive profits, the welfare gain to the domestic 
residents may be larger under imperfect competition. 
4.4.2 Long-Run Capital Mobility 
In this section, we turn to the case that capital is sectorally mobile. In this 
case, the rates of return on capital between sectors are identical (r^ =ry), and 
income of the native residents in the host economy is: 
I = Wy L + r^ K +rm (43) 
Differentiating equations (43) totally, using the relation dry = —^dWy and 
gr 
substituting the results into equation (40), the welfare effect can be expressed as 
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1 dV , dw^. f C^ dx F\ dx 
^^ = -Lf.—+ « p + n ( 4 4 ) 
dLj. ^ dLj.、厂 jc jdLj. U ) d L f � ) 
dl 
Equation (44) resembles equation (42), but its welfare implication is quite different. 
As shown in (34), when capital is sectorally mobile, the inflow of cross border 
workers causes each firm to reduce its output in the non-tradable sector. The 
decrease in each firm's output reduces profits and increases the average fixed cost 
borne by the firm. Thus, in equation (44), the second and third terms on the right 
hand side, which represent the profit and scale effects, respectively, are negative. 
Nevertheless, the first term on (44) gives a welfare gain to the native residents 
through a fall in the payments to foreign workers. Thus, the welfare effect of the 
inflow of cross border workers on the native residents in the host economy is in 
general ambiguous. If the negative effects of the profit and scale effects are greater 
than the positive effect of the fall in the wage payments, the welfare of the native 
residents in the host economy may be worsen. 
Kondoh (1999), using a mobile-capital framework, finds that immigration 
improves the welfare of the non-immigrants in the host economy under perfect 
competition. However, this favorable welfare gain to the domestic residents may 
not hold when oligopolistic competition is introduced into the mobile-capital model. 
Let us summarize the findings in this section: 
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Preposition 2. Suppose that the non-tradable sector is characterized by oligopolistic 
competition in the host economy. In the short run with sectorally immobile capital, 
the inflow of cross border workers improves the welfare of the native residents in the 
host economy. However, in the long run with capital mobility between sectors，the 
effect of the inflow of cross border workers on the welfare of the native residents is 
ambiguous. If the negative effects of the decrease in profits and of the increase in 
average fixed cost are greater than the positive effect of the decrease in wage 
payments to foreign workers, the welfare of the native residents in the host economy 
may be worsen. 
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Chapter 5 
Summary and Concluding Remarks 
The prevailing perception of the immigration policy is that it will improve the 
welfare of the host economy. In academic literature. Berry and Soligo (1969) and 
Kondoh (1999) find that immigration increases the welfare of the native residents in 
the host economy. When considering the presence of unemployment, Rivera-Batiz 
(1981a) and Fuest and Thum (2000) show that the welfare impact on the native 
residents is ambiguous. 
In this thesis, we have used two models to examine the impact of the inflow of 
cross border workers on the host economy. The first model fills the gap of Kondoh 
(1999), who considers the long run effect of immigration to the host economy when 
capital is sectorally specific. In reality，some production factors, such as capital, 
may be locked in and cannot move across sectors in the short run. We therefore in 
Chapter 3 examine the impacts of the inflow of cross border workers on income 
distribution and welfare of the native residents in the host economy when capital is 
sectorally specific. Nevertheless, the above studies are based on the assumption of 
perfect competition. It is of interest to examine the same issues of labor migration 
under imperfect competition. This has been done in Chapter 4. 
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We find that the inflow of cross border workers inevitably triggers the 
redistribution of income between factor owners in the host economy. For the 
short-run capital specificity, the inflows of foreign labor lower the wage rate, raise 
the rental rate in the tradable sector but result in ambiguous effects on the rental rate 
in the non-tradable sector in both cases of perfect and oligopolistic competition. On 
the other hand, when capital is sectorally mobile in the long run, the inflows of 
foreign labor lower the wage rate and raise the rental rate in the host economy in 
both cases of perfect and oligopolistic competition. 
This thesis has also examined the impact of the inflow of foreign labor on the 
welfare of the native residents in the host economy. For the short-run capital 
specificity, we find that the inflow of cross border workers enhances the welfare of 
the native residents in the host economy in both cases of perfect and oligopolistic 
competition. However, when capital is sectorally mobile and the economy is under 
oligopolistic competition, the welfare of the native residents in the host economy 
may be worsen after foreign labor inflows if the negative effects of the decrease in 
the profit and of the increase in the average fixed cost are greater than the positive 
effect of the reduction in wage payments to foreign workers. 
In spite of the above findings of the present study, this thesis has not considered 
several issues，such as different skill levels of foreign workers, the crowding out 
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effect of local jobs by foreign workers, etc. In addition, only one traded good is 
considered in the present models. An extension of the models by including an 
importable good would yield richer results. Those interesting issues will，however， 
be left for future studies. The present thesis can, nevertheless, serve as a footstone 
for this task. 
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Appendices 
Al. Allocation of Labor 
Holding Px, ^ x , ^y constant and differentiating equation (3) totally, we get: 
PxXujiLx-Y让 dL�. = 0 (Al.l) 
Using the factor market equilibrium in equation (6), the above equation can be 
rearranged as 
dLy. = 
IT广 PXXUAYll ( A 1 . 2 ) 
This shows that the inflow of cross border workers increases the labor demand in the 
non-tradable sector and the change is less than one. 
A2. Stability 
In Chapter 4, we follow Konishi et al. (1990) and assume that the factor markets 
and product market of the tradable good are adjusted immediately whereas each 
firm,s output in the non-tradable sector is adjusted slowly. Moreover, we assume 
that the number of firms is fixed. The adjustment process of jc can be defined as 
i = + Y^(I>\X) - m{w,.,尸,)) (A2.1) 
where rj is the positive adjustment coefficient. 
For the short run, we take a linear approximation (A2.1) around the equilibrium 
point, •x *，and employing equations (18), (20) and (22) to yield: 
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。一Jfl , , 叫 I 人Xl^S口 + 1 
LL … J s辽」 （似） 
As for the long run, we take a linear approximation (A2.1) around the equilibrium 
point，jc *，and employing equations (18)，(20) and (22) to obtain 
. Yi r ^An。石义儿ir 义"'•Lr 叫 A 
… ‘ / (紹） 
Thus, the sufficient condition for the stability in the short-run capital specificity 
y Qy 
is � + — > — and that in the long-run capital mobility is 1 +乙 >£21 and 
n n n n 
M T > 0 . 
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